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Fifteen years after David Dudley Field and his associates had
reported their celebrated Code of Civil Procedure to the New York
legislature, that code, and the system of "code pleading" to which it
lent its name, had been adopted by 16 states.1 In the years that fol-
lowed another 13 states turned to code pleading as a remedy for the ills
of the common law. Procedural reform showed no further signs of new
or original thinking, however, until the adoption in 1938 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The impact of these new rules on state pro-
cedures has been no less marked than was that of the Field Code; in
the fifteen years since the Federal Rules became effective, nine states
have adopted new procedures patterned after those Rules,' while seven
other states have enacted codes containing a substantial number of
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1. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 24 (2d ed. 1947).
2. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware (in the law courts), Kentucky, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Utah. The federal model has also been
followed in the territory of Alaska and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Develop-
ments here have indeed been swift. Thus in 1951 Kentucky and Nevada were listed
among the 10 states where "neither traces of federal reform nor bar activity to that
end seem apparent." Clark, The Federal Rudes in State Practice, 23 RocRy MT. L.
REv. 520, 523 n.14 (1951). Yet the Nevada Rules, very closely patterned after the
Federal model, became effective Jan. 1, 1953, while the Kentucky Rules take effect
on July 1st of this year.
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the concepts embodied in the Federal Rules.' It is, then, no longer
appropriate to speak of a state as adopting the "Federal Rules," for the
term hides the wide popularity these concepts enjoy in state procedures,
and the innovations and additions which state rulemakers have made.
A more descriptive label, and one which properly connotes a system as
different from code pleading as the Field Code was from the common
law, is "modern pleading." I
During this decade-and-a-half in which modern pleading has been
developed, Pennsylvania has made significant changes in its civil pro-
cedure. The first and obvious thing to say of the new Pennsylvania
Rules is that they do not represent a system of modern pleading, in
the sense in which that term was used above, and in which it will
shortly be defined. Of the states which have undergone large scale
procedural reform in the last fifteen years, Pennsylvania has been influ-
enced the least by the new concepts and improved techniques first sug-
gested in the Federal Rules. This observation represents no normative
judgment, but merely the statement of apparent fact. The policy of
the Pennsylvania Procedural Rules Committee was "to modernize pro-
cedure without sacrificing established Pennsylvania traditions which
are of proven merit." " No one can quarrel with such an objective.
Nor would it be appropriate for an outsider to take issue with the Penn-
sylvania rulemakers' judgment as to which Pennsylvania traditions
are of "proven merit," and which represent ancient habits better dis-
carded. Provisions no longer required in other jurisdictions may be
responsive to local needs which no outsider can gauge; rules which
would be too complex for other states may represent efficient working
tools in the hands of a bar as distinguished and scholarly as that boasted
by Pennsylvania.
I do not, therefore, understand this invitation by the editors of the
Review to compare the modern pleading of my adopted state with the
reformed common-law pleading of my native state as an occasion to
lecture Pennsylvania lawyers on how much better off they would be
with rules like Minnesota's. But it may be useful to the ongoing move-
ment for procedural reform in Pennsylvania to know what there is in
your recent changes which seems particularly striking to one whose
3. Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington.
The influence of the federal reform is also clearly seen in some parts of the codes or
rules of California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, and Oregon,
while Illinois and Wisconsin have discovery provisions not materially different, and
individual rules appear elsewhere, notably pre-trial rule 16, which is very widely
adopted, and often rule 50, dealing with directed verdicts.
4. As in the title of a recent casebook by the principal proponent of such a sys-
tem. CiAIC, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING (1952).
5. Kenworthey, Discovery Under The Proposed Nev Rides, 20 PA. B.A.Q.
17, 21 (1948).
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teaching, writing and practice have all been in a modem pleading juris-
diction.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE PENNSYLVANIA REFORM
A few brief comments on the Pennsylvania reform are in order
before turning to the Rules. Even at this distance one detects, and is
puzzled by, the apathy which practicing lawyers showed toward the
efforts the Procedural Rules Committee was making. Practically every
statement by a Committee spokesman comments on the paucity of com-
ments from lawyers on proposed drafts of rules.6 It is also of interest
to note that the criticism which the Committee did receive seems not
to have been directed at the Committee's draftsmanship of specific
rules, nor even at the abandonment by it of the old and familiar ways,
but rather at its failure to promote a reform as drastic as that wished
by at least the vocal elements of the bar.
Thus, according to one distinguished member of the Committee:
"I think one of the great difficulties of the Procedural Rules
Committee is the lack of constructive criticism from the members
of the Bar. We have heard criticism, but it has not been directed
at any one rule. It has been: 'You ought to adopt a Federal
Rule.' " 7
In Minnesota, by contrast, the bar was very outspoken when the new
rules were sent out for discussion and criticism. Our rules committee
was criticized for having made too many changes in the ancient prac-
tice, and it was only after significant concessions on the provisions
governing discovery and compulsory counterclaims that our rules were
adopted.
It is interesting to speculate whether the apathy of the bar was a
cause or an effect of the disinterest in the Rules evidenced by the four
outstanding law reviews in Pennsylvania. In the period 1938-1952,
while Pennsylvania pleading and practice was being so thoroughly re-
worked, only one article, two notes, and one recent case appeared in
the pages of this Review discussing either the Rules or the cases apply-
6. E.g., Hull, A critic "Views With Alarm," 12 PA. B.A.Q. 146, 160 (1941);
Amram, The New Procedural Rules, 45 ANN. R. P-A. B. ASS'N 56, 59 (1939);
Amram, The New Procedural Rules, 47 ANN. REP. PA. B. AsS'N 379, 380, 441
(1941); Report of the Executive Comm. 49 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'N 89 (1943);
Report of New Procedural Rules Comm. 55 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'N 100 (1949),
noting that from the thousands of lawyers who received copies of the 1943 draft of
proposed discovery rules, only 45 comments were received.
7. John H. Fertig, Esq., 49 ANN. RP. PA. B. Ass'N 89 (1943). See also the
remarks by the President of the Bar Association, id. at 86-7, and the criticism of the
new Rules by the Bar Association's Committee on Procedural Rules, 51 ANN. REP.
PA. B. Ass'N 91 (1945) and 55 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'x 172 (1949).
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ing and interpreting them.' The other reviews in the state did only a
little better. It seems unfortunate that this opportunity to provide
scholarly guidance to the Committee, in its drafting of rules, and to the
bar, in its use of them, was passed up. Happily the lawyer can find
help in Mr. Amram's book,9 surely the finest guide to the rules of a
particular state which has yet been written, and the Committee must
certainly .have derived stimulus from the exciting series of articles in
the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly in which platoons of
spokesmen for the Committee sought to parry the arguments of a de-
termined critic."
One general criticism which has been made of the Pennsylvania
Rules is that there are too many of them." At least in this form, the
objection seems to me to be largely irrelevant, particularly when it
leads to a sterile discussion as to whether each subsection of a Federal
Rule should be counted as a separate rule for purposes of comparison.
Rules should be criticized, not because they are too numerous, but be-
cause they are too detailed in the regulation they provide, if that be the
case. Modern thinking has been in the direction of leaving as much
as possible to the discretion of the trial judge, who is better able to
gauge what the necessities of a particular problem in a particular case
require than is a rulemaking body when it prescribes a fixed rule ap-
plicable to all cases. There is some evidence, particularly, as will be
seen, with regard to joinder of claims and parties, that the Pennsyl-
vania Rules do regulate in rather considerable detail matters which
elsewhere are left to the discretion of the trial judge. If this is gener-
ally true of the Pennsylvania Rules, then they might well lie criticized
on that ground by persons who feel that the wiser course is, indeed,
toward more flexibility and broader discretion. But this cannot be
8. The Minnesota Law Review, by way of contrast, has published six articles,
two notes, two recent cases, and two book reviews discussing the Minnesota Rules
since they became effective Jan. 1, 1952.
9. AmRcAm, GooDRIcH-AMRAm PENNSYVANIA PROCEDuRAL RuLEs SERvIcE WITH
FoRMs (1951) (cited hereafter as GOODRICH-AMRAM).
10. Graubart, Pennsylvania Is Moving Backwards, 12 PA. B.A.Q. 137 (1941);
Hull, A Critic "Views With Alarm," 12 PA. B.A.Q. 146 (1941); Graubart, A Critic
Replies, 13 PA. B.A.Q. 23 (1941); Graubart, Baron Surrentter Walks Again, 14
PA. B.A.Q. 126 (1943); Kenworthey, The Proposed Pleading Rides, 14 PA. B.A.Q.
210 (1943); Graubart, Comments on Proposed Procedural Rules for Deposiiions
and Discovery, 16 PA. B.A.Q. 34 (1944) ; Graubart, Comments on the Proposed Rides
of Civil Procedure Governing Actions at Law, 17 PA. B.A.Q. 210 (1946); Ken-
worthey and Anderson, The New Procedural Rules, 18 PA. B.A.Q. 59 (1946);
Kenworthey, Discovery Under The Proposed New Rides, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 17 (1948);
Graubart, Are We Afraid of Pretrial Discovery?, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 166 (1949).
11. Report of Comm. on Proc. Rules of the Pa. Bar Ass'n, 51 ANi. REP. PA.
B. Ass'N 90, 91 (1945) ; Graubart, Pennsylvania Is Moving Backwards, 12 PA.
B.A.Q. 137 (1941). A similar objection to the New York Civil Practice Act has
been urged as an argument for the adoption of modern pleading in that state.
Keeffe, Brooks and Greer, 86 or 1100, 32 CoRNELL L.Q. 253 (1946).
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proven by a mere counting of rules, as is shown by the usual rules on
discovery of the modem pleading systems; these systems usually have
twelve such rules, with numerous subsections, spelling out in consid-
erable detail the kinds of discovery available, even though "it might
have been possible or even desirable to have provided one single broad
rule authorizing all forms of discovery in any civil action." " Yet the
effect of all these rules is not to limit the trial court's discretion or the
parties' freedom, but rather to make clear just how great this discre-
tion and freedom are. Thus these rules do not offend the criterion
suggested above.
The notion of regulating procedural matters by flexible discre-
tionary action of the trial court rather than by rigid rules is one of the
essential points in the philosophy which underlies modern pleading.
The other essential point is that the desired goal of just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of controversies is not served by decisions
on technicalities of pleading, nor is it served if results turn on the skill
and diligence of counsel rather than on the merits of the case. This
philosophy finds its concrete expression in three great reforms:
(1) A real and effective merger of the forms of action and of law
and equity;
(2) Simplified pleadings, supplemented by a broad system of
pre-trial devices for getting at the merits;
(3) Unlimited joinder of claims and parties.
Only a system in which each of these three elements is present, at least
in substantial part, can be regarded as enjoying "modern pleading."
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure have liberalized the old
practice in the direction of each of these three objectives; none of them
has been achieved.
ONE FORM OF ACTION
The notion of abolishing the distinctions among the forms of
action is not novel with modern pleading; the draftsmen of the Field
Code 105 years ago spoke of its two most prominent features as being
"those relating to the abolition of the common law forms of action, and
to the union of legal and equitable remedies in a common system." 13
It seems fair to say that the first part of this objective, the abolition
of the distinctions between the common law forms, has everywhere
worked .smoothly and successfully, at least after the first few years
12. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
ad Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 502 (1950).
13. Surp. To CoDE PRoc. TEarmRARY Acr 3 (N.Y. 1848).
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when it was viewed with suspicion by judges accustomed to the old
niceties. Candor equally compels the admission that the second half
of the objective of the codifiers, the union of law and equity, has not
been without some travail. Particularly in New York, where the code
was first adopted, the courts persist in a failure to give real thought to
the procedural consequences of the union; thus one finds even today
such anomalies as actions being dismissed for having been brought to
the "wrong side" of a court which for a century has had only one
"side." 14 In the federal system, where union of law and equity was
long thought to pose constitutional problems, there has been little diffi-
culty in application of the 1938 merger. Even there, however, there
has been a widely-quoted dictum, especially surprising because of the
modernity of the court, showing nostalgia for the ancient distinc-
tions; 11 interestingly this dictum was uttered in the course of an
opinion which reached a result impossible except under a merged
system.16
Regrettably New York difficulties and Second Circuit dicta have
obscured the significant lesson which should be learned from a century
of experience with the merger of law and equity: in the great bulk of
American jurisdictions the merger has been made effective with little
discussion and even less difficulty." With such an important right as
trial by jury turning on the identification of an issue as "legal" or
"equitable," there have inevitably been cases in which parties have dif-
fered as to the effect of the merger, but, as I have said elsewhere, "their
very fewness carries its own significance." "8
Against this background one considers the explanations of the
Pennsylvania rulemakers for their preservation of the common law
actions and of separate systems of law and equity:
"The Procedural Rules Committee devoted an inordinate
amount of labor, research and study to the question of the practi-
cability of consolidating all actions into one form. This proved
14. These melancholy developments are canvassed in a thoughtful Note, Law and
Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, 55 YALE L.J. 826 (1946). See also Kharas,
A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 186 (1949) ;
Clark and Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 346, 353-7 (1950).
15. See Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499, 500 (2d Cir. 1947). A trial court
recently relied on this dictum to reach an old-fashioned and unfortunate result, Fanchon
& Marco, Inc., v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
criticized 52 COL. L. REv. 1069 (1952), but was promptly reversed for having done so.
18 Fed. Rules Serv. 2.12, case 1 (2d Cir. 1953).
16. As pointed out by 2 MooRE's FEaDEAL PRAcricE 458-460 (2d ed. 1948).
17. This proposition is examined at length in CLARiK, CODE PLEADING 78-127
(2d ed. 1947).
18. Clark and Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A
Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 346, 354 (1950).
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impossible. It is one thing to adopt a basic pattern for all forms
of action. But it is absolutely impossible to adopt a set of rules
dealing with process, venue and pleadings that are identical re-
gardless of the type of action." '0
[I]t hardly would be expected that any serious
effort would be made to consolidate law and equity, with their
substantial differences in subject-matter, special remedies, venue
and service in actions quasi-in-rem, trial procedure, post-trial pro-
cedure, and enforcement process. Nevertheless, the Committee
sought for a long time to find a way in which this consolidation
might be effected, with the Federal Rules as a possible precedent.
But, the differences were too substantial. Just as in the case of
Actions at Law, consolidation would have been illusory." 20
There is much truth in these comments. So long as merger of
procedural forms is not permitted to change substantive rights-and
this is the premise on which procedural reform has been based-there
will be a need for some special provisions in order to implement these
substantive rights. Yet it is hard to believe that those states which
have but one form of action are indulging in such an exercise in self-
delusion as the quoted remarks would seem to imply. Generally when
a state has abolished the forms of action it has discovered that it can
also abolish many of the former differences in procedure without im-
pairing substantive rights. Under the Pennsylvania Rules, for ex-
ample, a plaintiff suing in trespass can join causes of action only if
they arise from a common factual sequence.2' This restriction is re-
moved if the action is in assumpsit, and the plaintiff may join claims
which arose at different times and from unrelated transactions, pro-
vided only that they are similar in their legal nature, i. e., they must
all be either contractual or quasi-contractual. 22 But if suit is in equity,
all restrictions are gone, and even the most dissimilar claims may be
joined if they are within the jurisdiction of equity.' Are these distinc-
tions necessary to preserve any rights of substance? States with mod-
em pleading think not, and allow absolutely unlimited joinder of
claims regardless of the kind of action."4 Even the code states, though
19. Kenworthey and Anderson, The New Procedural Rides, 18 PA. B.A.Q. 59
(1946).
20. Amram and Schulman, The New Pennsylvania Equity Rides-A Survey,
100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1952).
21. PA. P. Civ. P. 1044.
22. PA. R. Civ. P. 1020 (a).
23. PA. R. Civ. P. 1508.
24. E.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 18.01. I have followed the practice throughout of
citing the Minnesota Rule, where it is typical of modern pleading rules discussed
in the text. Because the numbering systems are generally similar, the equivalent
rule in the Federal or other modem pleading system can readily be found.
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they limit joinder, allow claims which are factually related to be
joined regardless of their legal nature.
25
This example shows why Pennsylvania has found impossible what
other states think they have successfully accomplished. The Pennsyl-
vania Committee rather clearly was thinking in terms of a merger
which would preserve all the procedural differences now existing, and
the Committee was quite right in believing that such a merger would
be illusory, and would mean an incredibly complex and unwieldly set
of rules. Other states, by contrast, have thought that the whole pur-
pose of merger was to put an end to those differences in procedure
not necessary to preserve substantial rights, and they have found that
a very few procedural variants, which can be quite simply stated, are
enough to preserve those substantial rights-usually all that is needed
is to make jury trial, venue, and means of acquiring jurisdiction turn
on the nature of the action.
One of the most puzzling things to an outsider is the Committee's
failure to take even a halfway step toward one form of action by com-
bining assumpsit and trespass. The Committee itself at one time pro-
posed rules which would have accomplished this,2" in a recommenda-
tion which was justly praised.17 Yet for reasons which I can nowhere
find explained, this recommendation was withdrawn, and the distinc-
tion between trespass and assumpsit was preserved. The union of
these two actions, even if all else was left untouched, would have
greatly simplified judicial administration in Pennsylvania. Though I
have no statistics for your state, I think it clear that the great bulk of
the litigation in Pennsylvania courts falls under one of these two ac-
tions. In the not dissimilar Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, 84.6% of the actions commenced in the state courts in the year
ending June 30, 1952, were of a sort which in Pennsylvania would be
in either trespass or assumpsit.28 Because of the importance of these
two actions, it is worthwhile to examine the differences which made a
merger of them "impracticable for obvious reasons." 29
The differences under the new Rules between assumpsit and tres-
pass are few; they relate to venue and deputized service, joinder of
claims and counterclaims, default judgments, and the defendant's ap-
25. E.g., CoNr. REv. GEN. STAT. § 7819 (1949).
26. Recommendation No. 15 of the Procedural Rules Coon, 49 ANN. REP.
PA. B. ASS'N 184 (1943).
27. Note, The Scope of the Actim of Trespass, 47 DicK. L. REv. 242 (1943).
28. From the figures at 28 REP. MAss. JUD. CouNcIL 108 (1952), it appears that
26,709 cases were filed which, in Pennsylvania, would be in trespass or assumpsit,
3,328 cases which would be in equity, and 1,550 which would fall under one of the
other actions.
29. 1 GOODucH-AmRAm § 1001-2.
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pearance and answer. So far as four of these six matters are con-
cerned, the differences are entirely in form rather than in substance.
Thus venue in assumpsit is to be laid in a county where the defendant
can be served,"° while a trespass action may be brought in any such
county "or as provided by an Act of Assembly." 31 The reason for
the variation is that in some trespass actions the legislature has previ-
ously allowed suit to be brought in the county in which the cause of
action arose, even though defendant may not be served there. This
substantive right could have been as well protected by a rule, applicable
to both trespass and assumpsit, which would allow bringing an action
in any county in which defendant may be served or as allowed by an
Act of Assembly; all that would then be necessary would be to include
in the list of statutes superseded the Acts of Assembly which formerly
regulated assumpsit venue, while leaving intact the statutes on venue in
the old action of trespass. This is precisely what the Committee has
actually done in the present lists of statutes superseded.
Closely connected with this variation in venue is the trespass rule
which allows deputized service by the sheriff of another county where
the action is brought in the county where the cause of action arose."
This is, of course, quite unnecessary in assumpsit, where the action
can only be brought in a county where the defendant can be served,
but it is not inconsistent with any of the assumpsit rules; if the assump-
sit and trespass rules on venue were combined, this rule on deputized
service could be added thereto, without changing in any particular the
law and practice which Pennsylvania now enjoys.
The trespass rule on counterclaims allows counterclaims which
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as plaintiff's cause of
action; 3 the assumpsit rule allows counterclaims which arise from
the same transaction, etc., or which arise from contract or are quasi-
contractual.34 These rules, as they stand, are perfectly consistent, and
the assumpsit rule could have been applicable also to trespass without
the slightest difference in result, since only assumpsit claims can be
contractual or quasi-contractual, and thus be pleaded as counterclaims
under the second half of the assumpsit counterclaim rule. Such a
merger would allow tort and contract claims in the same action if they
arose from the same transaction, but it will be seen later that some
decisions have held this permissible under the present rules.
30. PA. k. Civ. P. 1006(a).
31. PA. R. Civ. P. 1042.
32. PA. P. Civ. P. 1043.
33. PA. R. Civ. P. 1046.
34. PA. P. Civ. P. 1031(a).
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The only variance between the assumpsit and trespass rules on
default judgments is that the trespass rule requires a trial on the issue
of damages 85 while the assumpsit rule allows the prothonotary to
assess damages, in lieu of such a trial, where the claim is "for a sum
certain or which can be made certain by computation." 36 The only
trespass cases which would fit the quoted description, and in which
a trial is required under the trespass rule while no trial would be re-
quired if the assumpsit rule were applicable, are those in which the
claim is for destruction or taking of property which has an ascertain-
able market value. Is the right to a trial in such a case really a sub-
stantial right which needs to be preserved?
We turn now to the two respects in which there is a substantial
difference between the two actions. One of those, as has already been
briefly discussed, is joinder of causes of action. Claims in trespass
may be joined if they arise from the same transaction or occurrence; 37
any claims which arise from contract or are quasi-contractual-which
I take to mean any assumpsit claims-may be joined no matter how
unrelated the transactions from which they arose. 8  When the Pro-
cedural Rules Committee was considering combining trespass and
assumpsit, it proposed a combination of the two rules which would
have preserved the present distinction, except that it would have been
possible to join a contract claim with a tort claim provided that they
arose from the same transaction or occurrence.3 ' This proposal was
essentially along the lines of the solution attempted by the Field Code.
40
Whether any limitation on joinder is necessary or advisable will be
discussed later; the liberalization involved in allowing assumpsit and
trespass claims to be joined is, of course, implicit in the very notion
of eliminating the distinctions between the forms of action. That the
failure of the Committee to adhere to this proposed liberalization has
had practical consequences in Pennsylvania will also later be seen.
There is evidence that the decision not to merge assumpsit and
trespass was not based on any of the five distinctions thus far dis-
cussed. Mr. Amram tells us that such a merger was impossible "be-
35. PA. R. Civ. P. 1047.
36. PA. R. Cirv. P. 1037(b).
37. PA. R. Civ. P. 1044.
38. PA. . CIV. P. 1020(a).
39. Proposed Rule 3041(a), 49 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'x 184, 193-4 (1943).
That this need not be regarded as too earthshaking a move may be discerned by
experience in other jurisdictions. Thus Massachusetts retains separate actions of
contract, tort, and replevin, but allows joinder of contract and tort "when they arise
out of the same matter." MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 231, § 7 (Supp. 1952). Alabama
has done much the same thing. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 7, § 220 (1940).
40. See the statute cited note 25 supra. For a criticism of this kind of statute,
see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 450-6 (2d ed. 1947).
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cause of the historic difference in the system of defense pleadings," 41
and that assumpsit and trespass are "substantially identical in all re-
spects except one small matter of pleading." 42 The small matter of
pleading, now preserved in the trespass rules,' is the shorthand answer,
styled "a general appearance," by which the defendant is deemed to
admit certain types of averments relating to the identity of the tort-
feasor, to agency, and to the instrumentality involved, while denying
all else. Whether this special kind of pleading, which trespass defend-
ants have been allowed in Pennsylvania since the Practice Act of 1915,
should be preserved need not now be considered. Assume that it
should. Does it follow that the whole distinction between assumpsit
and trespass, with all the difficulty that will be seen to have been thus
caused, need be preserved in order to retain this "Pennsylvania tradi-
tion . . . of proven merit"? The answer is clearly "No." This is
shown by the Procedural Rules Committee itself, in its draft of rules
which would have merged assumpsit and trespass and yet preserved
the essence of this special kind of pleading. The Committee at that
time proposed as part of the rule governing denials for lack of knowl-
edge or information " the following provision:
"An averment shall not be deemed to be admitted if proof
thereof is demanded and (1) the averment relates to injuries to
person or property, and is not an averment of the identity of the
person by whom a material act was committed, the agency or
employment of such person, the ownership, possession or control
of the property or instrumentality involved . . . .,
Certainly this provision is cumbersome. Certainly, too, it changes the
present practice to the extent of requiring defendant to file an answer
in which he formally demands proof of the plaintiff, rather than, as
now, merely filing a "general appearance." But the substantial right
involved, that of a shorthand simplified response, rather than a de-
tailed factual response, in tort litigation is preserved. And the cum-
bersomeness of the draftsmanship of one section of the rules seems
to me less objectionable than the complexity and hardship which
preservation of two separate forms of action has meant.
This suggestion that there should have been merger at least of
trespass and assumpsit is not the counsel of a theoretical perfection;
41. Amram and Schulman, Thw New Pennsylvanzia Equity Rules-A Survey, 100
U. OF PA. L. Rv. 1089, 1090 (1952).
42. Id. at 1091.
43. PA. R. Civ. P. 1045.
44. Now PA. R. CIv. P. 1029(c).
45. Proposed Rule 3042(c), 49 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'N 184, 194 (1943).
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sound judicial administration in Pennsylvania has suffered by the
failure to make such a merger. There are two ways that courts can
apply the distinctions between different forms of action. They can
do so rigidly and throw out cases because the wrong form was chosen.
If this course is followed cases will have been determined because of
procedural errors, rather than on their merits, a result which has long
been universally condemned. The alternative is to be liberal, to ignore
errors in the form of action, and to give the parties the relief to which
they are entitled. If this salutary course is followed, the distinction
between the actions is reduced to a useless and formal technicality,
which accomplishes no more than to cause argument and delay the
determination of meritorious cases.
Pennsylvania courts, under the new Rules, have experimented in
both directions.4" The Supreme Court has allowed a plaintiff who
sued in trespass for fraud when he should have sued in assumpsit to
keep his verdict without bothering with amendment of the form of
action and a new trial on the amended complaint." And the learned
court has said:
. . . [T]he distinctions between trespass and assumpsit
have been, in the interest of justice, to a large extent abolished
and therefore in this case the form of the action should not pre-
vent the recovery of damages to which the injured party is justly
entitled and which he successfully proved." 48
This, unhappily, is from the very same court which had announced:
"While there is a distinct tendency toward relaxation of the
strictness of the common law as regards pleadings, a plaintiff can-
not successfully maintain an action in one form by averring facts
establishing a valid cause of action if properly brought in another
form. It is immaterial that the damages recoverable might be
identical." 11
46. As is evidenced by the learned text writer, who, in an effort to conform with
judicial teachings, offers the following paragraph, in which the final two sentences
flatly contradict the first two sentences: "The distinction between assumpsit and
trespass remains. Despite the broad right to amend the form of action, the separate
identity of the two actions requires the plaintiff to identify his action correctly.
The label used, whether assumpsit or trespass, is of no importance. The court will
examine the complaint in any case to determine the true nature of the action." 1
GooDxcH-AMRAm § 1001-3.
47. Littler v. Dunbar, 365 Pa. 277, 280, 74 A.2d 650, 651 (1950), quoting from
the fine opinion of the Superior Court in Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R., 155 Pa. Super. 286, 289, 38 A.2d 732, 733-4 (1944): "Scarcely any
procedural defect is viewed with greater tolerance by modern courts than errors in
the form of the action. . . . If it is expedient, as a nod to formalism, the proper
amendment will be considered to be made. .. ."
48. Taylor v. Kaufhold, 368 Pa. 538, 544, 84 A.2d 347, 351 (1951).
49. Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 162-3, 63 A.2d 24, 26 (1949).
1953] MODERN PLEADING AND THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES 921
As might be expected, this schizophrenic view as to whether the
wrong choice of action is a mortal or a venial sin has seeped down to
the trial courts. In one case the court concluded that plaintiff's ingeni-
ous attempt to recover for his personal injuries in assumpsit, by charg-
ing a breach by defendant host of a promise of safe carriage, was not
permissible, but it allowed plaintiff to amend to change the form of
action to an action in trespass for a tort.5 By this liberal decision
nothing was lost except the time required to bring on defendant's ob-
jections to the form of action for argument, and the work caused the
court in writing its 10 page opinion deciding that assumpsit was the
wrong name to appear at the head of the pleadings.
A somewhat different view was taken in another case in which
the owner of property had served notice on one in possession, with
whom the owner had no contractual relation, that he would be charged
a certain rate if he remained on the premises. Subsequently the owner
sued in assumpsit to recover for rental and use and occupancy of the
premises. The court held that no contract had been created by the
notice to the occupier, and that he remained a trespasser, to be sued
only in trespass. But no amendment changing the form of action was
allowed. Instead the court said:
"The action should be discontinued and suit brought in tres-
pass unless the parties by stipulation agree that the case may be
continued as if brought in trespass." "'
Assuming that the defendant, having thus far objected to the form of
action, will not generously stipulate that the existing suit may be con-
tinued as if in trespass, the plaintiff is faced with, at best, the delay
and expense of starting a new suit. If the statute of limitations on a
trespass action happens to have run, or if the defendant has left the
jurisdiction, one shudders to think of the plaintiff's sad plight.
The harshest kind of result being reached by the trial courts re-
mains to be presented. Plaintiff had a reservation for a seat on a cer-
tain airplane flight. When he arrived at the airport, the airline refused
to allow him to board the plane, explaining that through the negli-
gence of a new clerk the seat had been sold to a second person. Plain-
tiff, substantially damaged by not being able to make the flight, sued
the airline in trespass, charging negligence. The court concluded that
the action should have been brought in assumpsit. This decision may
well have been right-I leave such a determination to others better
versed in the scope of the common-law forms; surely the question is
50. Minnick v. Scheffy, 31 North. Co. Rep. 323 (1948).
51. Eisen v. Eisen, 66 Pa. D. & C. 347, 348 (1949).
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at least difficult and doubtful. It is the penalty imposed for this under-
standable error in choice of action which is shocking. The court
refused to allow an amendment changing the form of action, saying:
"It is only those cases where there has been a waiver of the
improper form of action that the courts have permitted amend-
ment of the form of action. Defendant having taken timely ad-
vantage of defects in the form of action and we, having decided
that plaintiff cannot maintain this action in trespass although he
does have a cause of action sueable in assumpsit. . . "
The court ordered dismissal of the action and judgment for the defend-
ant.
52
Pennsylvania's retention of the forms of action in order to avoid
a somewhat cumbersome phraseology in one rule would be difficult
enough to justify if the only cost were the delay, the judicial waste
motion, and the occasional unconscionable result indicated in the cases
just discussed where plaintiff has chosen the wrong form. There is,
however, another price, and one which is exacted even of the most
historically-minded plaintiffs who know exactly which of the old forms
is appropriate. This is the confusion and the added expense involved
when these distinctions of form become intertwined with the joinder
rules. The philosophy of joinder in Pennsylvania, we are told, is to
allow the parties in one action "to adjudicate all rights growing out
of a certain factual background." 11 This is, as will later be seen, more
restrictive than the philosophy of joinder followed in modem pleading
jurisdictions. In truth, it states only a minimum of joinder in Penn-
sylvania, for in assumpsit claims and counterclaims may be joined
which arise out of entirely different factual backgrounds so long as
the claims are contractual or quasi-contractual in nature. 54 Yet in
many cases even this stated minimum is not achieved in Pennsylvania
because of the preservation of the forms of action.
Consider this situation: a deadbeat tenant fails to pay rent; when
the lease ends he leaves the apartment in a mess, with fingerpainting
all over the wallpaper, cigarette burns in the carpeting, an expensive
lamp smashed into a million pieces, and an antique chair missing. The
fuming landlord storms to his lawyer, brandishing a copy of the lease
in which the tenant had agreed to leave the apartment in as good con-
dition as when he moved in. "Make that rascal pay," he demands.
52. Hohensee v. Colonial Airlines, Inc., 75 Pa. D. & C. 347, 352 (1950). This
horror is properly castigated in 1 GOODRiCH-AmRAm, Anno. to § 1001-3.
53. 2 GOoDRICH-AmRAm § 2255(d) -9. To the same effect, see Reo Motors, Inc.
v. Wolf, 70 Pa. D. & C. 463, 467 (1950).
54. PA. R. Civ. P. 1020(a), 1031(a) (2).
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I should hate to be the lawyer who has to explain to a seething
client that making the rascal pay will require not one but two law-
suits. I should hate to have to give a good reason for the added
expense and bother of a second lawsuit, when, for the life of me, I can
think of none. Nor do I think that the rulemakers, who contemplated
that one suit would be enough to settle all the controversies "growing
out of a certain factual background," would care to assert that these
various claims, for rent, for damage to the wall and carpeting, and
for the destroyed lamp and the missing chair, grow out of different
factual background. Yet two suits it must be. Why? Because the
claim for rent is a claim in assumpsit, the claim for damage to the
wall and carpeting is a claim for breach of the covenant to restore the
premises to good condition and thus a claim in assumpsit, but the
claim for destruction of the lamp and taking of the chair is a claim in
trespass. This sad situation is not the hypothetical vaporing of a
law professor; it is a decision of a respected Court of Common Pleas.55
Nor can the court be blamed; it is so clear under the Rules that assump-
sit and trespass claims may not be joined that no other result would
have been possible. 6
Preservation of the distinction between tort and assumpsit has also
caused confusion, and departure from the principle of settling at one
time all controversies arising from the same factual background, where
counterclaims have been involved. Here, unlike the joinder of causes
of action rules, there is nothing in the Rules themselves to prevent a
claim in assumpsit and a counterclaim in trespass, or vice versa, so
long as both claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence. A
case arose in which a former member of a dissolved partnership sued
in assumpsit seeking an accounting for his share of the profits due him
under the dissolution agreement. The remaining partners asserted, by
way of counterclaim, that plaintiff had used his name in such a manner
as to mislead the public into thinking he was still with the partner-
ship. These conflicting claims would seem to arise from a common
factual background, and to be a part of the same transaction or occur-
rence or series of transactions or occurrences. Yet the Supreme Court
refused to allow the counterclaim:
"It is sufficient to say that that claim rests in tort and can-
not be made the basis of a counterclaim in an action of assumpsit.
It cannot, therefore, be said to have arisen, within the
intendment of Pa. R. C. P. No. 1031 (a), . . from the same
55. Baker v. Connolly, 23 Northumberland Legal J. 171 (1951).
56. 1 GooD=cH-AmAm § 1020(a)-1: "There is no change in the prohibition
against the joinder of contract and tort claims in the same suit." See PA. R. Civ.
P. 1020(a), 1044.
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transaction from which Clarence J. O'Brien's cause of action
arose." 57
Naturally enough the trial courts have followed in this same
direction, and have disallowed trespass counterclaims in assumpsit
actions, even where the factual connection has been closer than in the
quoted case.
5
It would be bad enough that the courts have read into the Rules
a limitation on counterclaims which they do not contain, and which is
at variance with the philosophy of joinder intended by the rule-
makers. Confusion is confounded, however, when it is discovered
that in the converse situation-suit in trespass, counterclaim in assump-
sit-no such limitation is made, and the counterclaim is allowed.
Worse still, in one of these cases, decided after the Supreme Court's
decision quoted above, the trial court said:
"This rule permits all counterclaims which arise from the
same transactions or occurrences from which plaintiff's cause of
action arises regardless of whether they sound in trespass or
assumpsit." "
About this time the Minnesota lawyer turns with new .apprecia-
tion to the Minnesota rule: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim
any claim against an opposing party .
Although I think it would have greatly simplified Pennsylvania
procedure to have merged assumpsit and trespass, this does not mean
that a broader merger, an effective union of all the forms of action,
both legal and equitable, would not have been desirable. Obvious con-
siderations of space make it impossible to analyze the reasons for and
against retaining the separate identity of the other actions. Neverthe-
less an example or two of the consequences of preserving these other
distinctions may help to stimulate thinking about their continued
vitality.
The owner of a house had allowed his wife's mother and sister
to share the house with him. After the death of his wife, the owner
wanted to remarry; while he was willing to continue to care for his
57. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 72-3, 66 A.2d 309, 312 (1949).
58. Calandra v. Garfield Refractories Co., 32 Westmoreland L.J. 127 (1950) (the
court saying that the claims arise from the same transaction) ; Craig v. Thoroughgood,
61 Pa. D. & C. 220 (1947).
59. Reo Motors, Inc. v. Wolf, 70 Pa. D. & C. 463, 467 (1950). The commend-
able decision to the same effect in Jones v. Auto Rental Co., 63 Pa. D. & C. 207
(1948), distinguishes the cases in which the original claim was in assumpsit.
60. MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.02.
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former mother-in-law, he asked his dead wife's sister to leave, claim-
ing he needed more space. When she refused, the owner, on February
7, 1950, brought an action to get her out, styling it "an action to quiet
title." The case came on with remarkable speed; on May 19, 1950,
the court held, with obvious regret, that plaintiff had brought the
wrong kind of action." An action to quiet title would not lie, for the
defendant had no right, title, or interest in the property which could
be quieted. Nor, said the court, could plaintiff use ejectment to get
rid of the unwelcome guest, for ejectment is proper only where the
plaintiff has been entirely ousted from possession. The proper rem-
edy, plaintiff was told, was a special summary proceeding under the
Act of March 31, 1905. Dutifully the plaintiff brought a new action,
before an alderman as required by the 1905 Act. The decision here
was in his favor, but an appeal by defendant brought the matter once
more to the Common Pleas Court. After a wrangle over procedure,
the court held that an appeal from an alderman under the 1905 Act
was to be tried in the same manner as ejectment-and thus in the
same manner as plaintiff had been told before the action could not
be tried-and applying such a procedure to the case, the court granted
judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff, and ordered the sister-in-law
to leave immediately."2 Thus on January 19, 1951, the would-be
bridegroom was finally allowed to get off this procedural merry-go-
round and have his house to himself, with, presumably, a feeling of
fervent gratitude that he had not had to follow this tortuous path
through a court calendar more crowded than that of Lancaster Ccunty.
The preservation of the bifurcation between law and equity, where
the difference is only one of remedy rather than of the nature of the
action, also deserves thought. Suppose that at various times two
parties have made two separate and unrelated contracts, and that one
of the parties has breached both. The innocent party can bring one
action and recover damages for both breaches.' He may bring one
action and get specific performance of both contracts. 4 But if plain-
tiff happens to want specific performance of one contract and damages
for breach of the other-and he would have no choice if, for example,
one contract was for sale of land while the other was for personal
services or for sale of a fungible-he must bring two suits. Joinder
of legal and equitable causes of action is not possible. By way of
strange contrast, a legal counterclaim can be interposed in an equitable
61. Baehr v. Hagan, 74 Pa. D. & C. 145 (1950).
62. Baehr v. Hagan (No. 2), 76 Pa. D. & C. 251 (1951).
63. PA. R. Cirv. P. 1020(a).
64. PA. R. Civ. P. 1508.
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action if defendant is willing to waive trial by jury,6" although an
equitable counterclaim is not allowed in a legal action.
Enough of one form of action; Pennsylvania patently does not
have it-modern pleading jurisdictions do. This outsider, after ex-
amining what preservation of this "tradition . . . of proven merit"
means in practice, is not convinced that Pennsylvania has made the
wiser choice.
SIMPLIFIED PLEADINGS
While the Pennsylvania Rules on the pleadings proper were under
consideration, the bar was asked to give thought to whether these
rules should ". . . perpetuate by an improved codification the familiar
principles of our present system of fact-pleading . . . " or whether
they should embody ". . a new system of notice-pleading
... .3) 66 It is true that some judges who are not students of pro-
cedure have referred to the general statements allowed under modern
pleading as "notice-pleading." The truth is that the Federal and
other modern pleading systems no more allow "notice-pleading," in
the sense in which that term has been traditionally used, than does the
Pennsylvania system.
Let us get straight just what "notice-pleading" is, in order that
we may be sure what modern pleading is not. "Notice-pleading" is a
system in which the pleading, such as it is, simply makes a very general
reference to the happening out of which the case arose and no attempt
is made to state the details of the cause of action.67 A complaint in
such a system might say merely:
"Plaintiff demands $10,000 damages for negligent injuries
inflicted by defendant June 1, 1948 on University Avenue, St.
Paul."
In this country Virginia alone has made any wide use of such a pro-
cedure."" Nor is more widespread use of "notice-pleading" advocated
by any responsible spokesman of the modern pleading systems.69 In
65. PA. R. Civ. P. 1510.
66. Kenworthey, The Proposed Pleading Rides, 14 PA. B.A.Q. 210, 211 (1943).
67. The definition is from CLARK, CODE PLEADING 240 (2d ed. 1947), where such
a system is criticized as probably too general and thus unacceptable.
68. E.g., Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99 (1936); Fowler, Virginia Notice of
Motion Procedure-a Case Study in Procedural Reform, 24 VA. L. REv. 711 (1938).
69. Thus Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal drafsman of the Federal Rules,
has carefully distinguished and rejected "notice-pleading." Clark, Simplified Plead-
ing, A.B.A. JuD. Aim. MONOGRAPHS, SERIES A, 100 (1942); CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
ING 225-245 (2d ed. 1947). See note 75 infra.
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honesty I must say that my own thinking is that of "cynicism and
despair as far as pleading is concerned," 70 and that I would welcome
the adoption of a system of "notice-pleading" in which it would be left
to the discovery processes to produce all of the facts. This idiosyncrasy
of mine is of importance only as emphasizing what anyone who has
studied the matter must realize-modern pleading rules do require
much more than mere notice. They require "fair notice of each mate-
rial fact of the pleader's cause." 1
How, then, does modern pleading differ from the historic system
of "fact-pleading?" The difference is all one of the degree of gener-
ality which is to be permitted, and in practice the most important
application of these differences of degree are that under modern plead-
ing rules a party may allege general conclusions, while in fact-pleading
systems he must steer his course between the Scylla of evidence and
the Charybdis of conclusions and state only the "ultimate facts."
Take, for example, the form to be used in an automobile accident
case, as set out in the official forms which are commonly appended to
modern pleading rules.
"1. On June 1, 1948, in a public highway called University
Avenue, in St. Paul, Minnesota, defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said high-
way.
"2. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg
broken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from transact-
ing his business, suffered great pain of body and mind, and in-
curred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the
sum of one thousand dollars.
"Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
in the sum of ten thousand dollars and costs." 72
What more could be wanted, by the court or by the defendant,
than this form, with its long common-law tradition,78 provides? What
possibly is gained by telling plaintiff that he must specify in detail the
respects in which the defendant was negligent? ' The form set out
particularizes the claim to a running-down accident with the defend-
70. Michael, The Basic Rules of Pleading, 5 THE RECORD 175, 192 (1950).
71. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 232 (2d ed. 1947).
72. MINN. R. Civ. P. Form 8.
73. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (1883); Couture
v. Gauthier, 123 Me. 132, 122 Atl. 54 (1923) ; Reichwein v. United Electric Rys. Co.,
68 R.I. 365, 27 A.2d 845 (1942). And Blume, Tleory of Pleadings: A Survey
Including The Federal Rules, 47 MicH. L. REv. 297, 335 (1949), points out that the
quoted form "does set forth enough to show that plaintiff has a legally sufficient
claim against defendant."
74. Cf. Keys v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 29 Wash. Co. Rep. 216 (1949);
Peterson v. Hauck, C.P. Montg. Co., Sept. Term, 1947, No. 56. Similarly with
regard to damages, is anything gained by requiring, as in Spittler v. Youngling
Dairy Products Corp., 46 Sch. L. R. 144 (1949), that an allegation of a scar
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ant's automobile while the plaintiff was on a certain street on a partic-
ular date; since the parties are unlikely to have had many accidents at
this same time and place, a sound basis for res judicata is provided.
This complaint makes it clear that the case is one in which jury trial
will be appropriate. And it sufficiently identifies the kind of accident
so that a trained mind immediately recognizes the kinds of misdeeds
of which the defendant may have been guilty, and prepares himself to
face charges of such kinds of conduct."
Suppose, however, that we regard this as too general a complaint,
and demand that the plaintiff specify the respect in which defendant
is thought to have been negligent. Two courses of conduct are then
open to plaintiff. Relying on his own recollection of the few traumatic
seconds between the time the defendant's car hove into view and its
collision with him, plaintiff may attempt to specify some way in which
he thinks defendant erred. If, at the trial, evidence develops that the
defendant was not negligent in the way claimed, but was negligent in
some other particular, are we to throw plaintiff's meritorious claim out
of court for his failure to make the right guess? Unless we do, all the
supposed value of a detailed specification of negligence is gone. But
if we do throw plaintiff out-as a few distinguished courts have tried 7
-we have done incalculable damage to the notion of deciding cases
on their merits rather than on their pleadings. Moreover, we have
achieved nothing in exchange, for such a decision will merely force
pleaders to set out all the possible kinds of negligence which could
conceivably apply, and, for good measure, a few which could not.
That this is actually the course followed in Pennsylvania we have
from no less an authority than Judge Kenworthey:
on plaintiff's face set forth its length, width, and exact location, that an allegation
of "internal injuries" describe their type and nature, that an allegation of injury to
the nervous system state whether the injury was permanent or temporary and func-
tional or organic, and that an allegation that plaintiff was "partially confined" state
the exact extent of the confinement and whether plaintiff was able to do any work
or receive any earnings?
75. Clark, Simplified Pleading, A.B.A. JuD. ADm. MONOGRAPHS, SERIES A,
100, 106 (1942). And see Clark, Book Review, 47 NORTHwESTERN U.L. REV.
739, 740-1 (1952), criticizing the advocacy of "notice-pleading" at MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCFDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL. PERsPECrvE 193 (1952) : "I still do
think there is much to be said for the fair compromise of the rules. The present
rule is in line with traditional habits of most well-informed lawyers and has thus
proved its practicability; the pleading it envisages does give a considerable amount
of valuable information for the case itself, for selection of the mode of trial, and
for recognition and enforcement of the principle of res judicata; and the rule's
comparative leniency avoids undue burdens and waste. These advantages are to be
weighed against the complete indefiniteness of the seemingly attractive admonition
of mere 'notice'."
76. E.g., Frosch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 300, 199 Atl. 646 (1938),
finding, after verdict and on appeal, a fatal variance between a complaint that plaintiff
stumbled over a tricycle left in the aisle and proof that she tripped over the handle
bars of a tricycle which protruded into the aisle from under a counter.
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"The pleader in a negligence case-and such cases constitute
most of the litigation in this state-invariably avers all the grounds
of negligence which, by any strength of his fertile imagination,
could possibly apply, and he follows the same procedure when he
sets forth the nature and extent of the personal injuries which his
client has suffered. And when the defendant reads such a plead-
ing, he knows little about what plaintiff will actually prove except
perhaps the date and location of the accident. He learns about
the facts of the case from his own investigation of it, including
the report of a physician who has made an examination of the
plaintiff." 77
What information is given, then, by requiring statement of "the
material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based 8 ., 7
rather than "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief ?" 7 How are the issues any more clearly
defined?
This teaching is again emphasized by the procedure, unique to
Pennsylvania, of a short-hand form of answer in trespass cases s Three
reasons are given for this special procedure. First, an answer might
incriminate the defendant if the trespass is also the basis of a possible
criminal action. This argument is patently nonsense."' The second
reason given, that probably defendant will plead "lack of knowledge
anyhow, can hardly be more than a makeweight. The real reason for
this special practice in trespass seems to be the third reason which is
given for it:
"As a practical matter, the general averments by way of
defense disclose nothing of importance to the plaintiff because he
knows exactly what the nature of the defendant's defenses will
be." 82
This is a far more cynical and despairing view of the pleadings
than the draftsmen of modern pleading systems have taken. Indeed
it seems fair to say that when the pleadings have closed in a Pennsyl-
vania trespass action, the parties and the court know surely no more---
77. Kenworthey, The Proposed Pleadnq Rules, 14 PA. B.A.Q. 210, 214-5
(1943).
78. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a).
79. MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.01(a).
80. See text at note 41 stpra.
81. If the allegations of the complaint are not true, defendant can surely deny
them without fear of incrimination. If they are true, he need merely remain silent
and the allegations will be admitted for frurposes of the trespass action only.
82. 1 GooDRcH-AMRAm § 1045 (b) -1, which is based on a speech by Judge Robert
Ralston, one of the draftsmen of the 1915 Practice Act which pioneers this pro-
cedure. 72 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 814-5 (1915).
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and quite possibly less-about how the tort occurred and what the
issues are than they would know in any of the modern pleading
jurisdictions.
The new Rules have achieved some important advances in Penn-
sylvania pleading. The strictures of a critic " induced the Committee
to abandon a proposal by which defendant could have first demurred,
then filed a petition raising defects in bar to which an answer by
plaintiff and evidence would have been necessary; and then, if still
unsuccessful, defendant could finally have filed an answer admitting,
denying, or avoiding the allegations of the complaint. The Committee
finally rejected this "meticulously scientific and logical system" " in
favor of a requirement that all preliminary objections be raised at one
time,8" and there are indications that the trial courts are putting teeth
into this time-saving procedure." The specific listing of defenses which
must be affirmatively pleaded will end much idle controversy, and is
in accord with modern thinking; I have some doubt, however, as to
the desirability of applying this so rigidly as not to allow the named
defenses .to be raised by demurrer or preliminary objections where
the defect is readily apparent and will dispose of the case." The provi-
sion of a new step in the pleadings, the counter-reply,8 8 is contrary to
the trend in other jurisdictions of lessening the number of pleadings
allowed. The Committee, however, cannot be blamed for the applica-
tion by a trial court of a doctrine of "negative pregnant" so silly-
and so wasteful, since defendant was given leave to amend-that it
is studied as a horrible example by law students throughout the
country. 9
PRE-TRIAL DEVICES FOR GETTING AT THE MERITS
Modern pleading systems are based on the supposition that the
pleadings alone will not disclose the merits of the parties' contentions
or narrow the issues; instead, therefore, of a futile attempt to make
them do so, the pleadings are deliberately left more general, and other
83. Graubart, Baron Surrebutter Walks Again, 14 PA. B.A.Q. 126 (1943).
84. 1 GooDRicH-AmRAm § 1028(b)-1.
85. PA. R. Civ. P. 1028(b).
86. E.g., Yanko v. Donaldson, 65 Pa. D. & C. 341 (1948).
87. Compare the more rigid rule of Margolis V. Miller, 170 Pa. Super. 148, 84
A.2d 213 (1951); Jamison v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores, 68 Pa. D. & C. 121
(1949) ; and 1 GOODRIcH-AMRAM § 1030-2, with the liberal view taken in Haskell v.
Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184, 69 A.2d 71 (1949) ; and Ambers v. Girondo, 69 Pa. D. & C.
15 (1949).
88. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(a).
89. Martin v. Barfield, 66 Pa. D. & C. 321 (1948), reprinted CLARK, CASES
ON MODERN PLEADING 279 (1952).
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devices which have been found to be more effective are substituted
for finding the facts and the issues. The Pennsylvania Rules, by con-
trast, " . are drawn on the theory that the issues for trial can be
narrowed through the use of sworn pleadings stating the facts which
each side proposes to prove, and that the auxiliary processes of general
discovery, interrogatories, requests for admission and summary judg-
ment will not be needed." " Perhaps because of a sound hunch that,
as shown in the last section, even in Pennsylvania pleadings do not
accomplish as much as people like to imagine, the Pennsylvania Rules
do provide all of these supposedly-needless auxiliary devices except
summary judgments.
Pennsylvania provides, for example, authority for pre-trial con-
ferences every bit as broad as that granted in other jurisdictions."' It
is impossible for one not on the scene to tell how pre-trial has been
working in your courts. There is an early report indicating great ac-
complishments in Pittsburgh by use of this technique,"s a result per-
haps not unrelated to the evidenced willingness of Pittsburgh judges to
make broad use of the powers given them. 3 In Philadelphia pre-trial
was for a time made compulsory in assumpsit actions, but this trial
was seemingly not successful, for the rule so providing was later re-
scinded.94 Judge Kenworthey suggests some unpopularity elsewhere,"5
but he indicates, as does Mr. Amram, 6 that the trouble with the pre-
trial rule is that it does not give the court the power to compel disclos-
ure by the attorneys or to make binding rulings on parts of the case
which are not disputed. These problems are more a matter of discov-
ery and summary judgment power, than of pre-trial. So far as the
usefulness of the pre-trial conference itself goes, the Pennsylvania pic-
ture seems, so far as one can judge, to be that of experimentation, with
everyone concerned reserving decision until this new procedure has be-
come more familiar. Such a development is much like that which
90. 1 GoomRcH-AmRAm § 1017-1.
91. PA. R. Civ. P. 212.
92. McNaugher, The Pre-Trial Court At Pittsburgh, 6 U. oF PirT. L. REv. 5
(1939), reporting that 43Y2% of the cases heard at a pre-trial conference were
finally disposed of at that stage.
93. Cf. Abernathy v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 47 Pa. D. & C. 575 (1943).
94. Rule 234(1) of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, adopted
Dec. 21, 1939, and rescinded Dec. 3, 1942. It is interesting that Philadelphia should
have required pre-trial only in assumpsit cases, since federal judges who have con-
ducted pre-trial conferences reported, on a questionnaire, that they found the device
most helpful in negligence actions. ANN. REP. Din or THE ADm. Omm, U.S.
CouRTs 72 (1941).
95. Kenworthey, The Proposed Pleading Rules, 14 P. B.A.Q. 210 (1943).
96. 1 GoouaicH-Amn' § 212-7.
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other jurisdictions have undergone before finally becoming convinced
of the merit of pre-trial and requiring its use in every case.
97
So far as the other pre-trial devices for getting at the merits are
concerned, i.e., discovery and summary judgment, the Pennsylvania
development has been less typical. Particularly striking to the outsider
are the limitations on discovery which require that leave of court be
obtained before discovery may be had, and which restrict the scope of
such discovery to matter which would be admissible as evidence at a
trial, and which is necessary to prove a prima facie claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery. These limitations are the more sur-
prising because they seem to have been adopted over the objection of
the organized bar, and because they do not seem to be well received
by the judges. Indeed one wonders who in Pennsylvania, except the
members of the Procedural Rules Committee, favored such limitations.
The history of your discovery rules is quite interesting. The rules,
as adopted, are the third set proposed by the Committee, each more lib-
eral than the last." When the second of these proposals was made by
the Committee in 1948, after a 1943 proposal had been scathingly criti-
cized,99 a Committee spokesman explained that one of the premises on
which the rules were based was that: ". . . the ends of justice are
not best served by giving every litigant the power to explore without
restraint his opponent's case." '10 A few lawyers might quarrel with
97. Thus a former Federal trial judge says: "A number of judges who have
with indifference or even reluctance adopted the practice of holding pre-trial con-
ferences are now convincd that the time spent on them is time saved at the trial,
multiplied many times." Duffy, J., in Mead v. Cochran, 184 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir.
1950). And see the following very balanced statement by an exceptionally able
Minnesota trial judge who was asked what the effect of pre-trial has been in the
15 months it has been used in the crowded Minneapolis courts: "Pre-trial conferences
are another means for trying to speed up our calendar situation. They bring opposing
attorneys before the court informally for discussion free of most of the limitations of
rules of evidence. If attorneys will cooperate with the court at these conferences,
I certainly believe that parties will get better justice. Whether we are accomplish-
ing speedier justice is hard to determine statistically in the few short months that
pre-trials have been used. Pre-trial conferences take one of our judges away from
the trial of cases. I feel certain that we save time for the parties involved in a
particular lawsuit when they get to trial. Whether we save enough time for the
entire court to make up for taking him out of the work of trying cases still has to
be determined. I believe these conferences are helping." Hon. Leslie L. Anderson,
Judge of Hennepin County District Court, in an unpublished radio script, "You and
the Law," March 12, 1953. See also Van Cise, The Colorado Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 23 RocKy MT. L. REv. 527, 532-3 (1951) ; Note, Calendar Congestion, in the
Southern District of New York, 51 Co. L. Ray. 1037, 1050 n.74 (1951) ; State v.
District Court, 121 Mont. 320, 194 P.2d 256 (1948).
98. "We cannot ignore the history of these rules whereby the tentative drafts
submitted to the bench and bar became increasingly more liberal until they reached
their present form." Klosterman v. Clark, 78 Pa. D. & C. 263, 264 (1951).
99. Graubart, Comnents on, Proposed Procedural Rules for Depositions and Dis-
covery, 16 PA. B.A.Q. 34 (1944).
100. Kenworthey, Discovery Under the Proposed New Rides, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 17,
23 (1948).
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this, the spokesman noted, but the Committee felt sure that "the vast
majority of our lawyers and judges will approve." 101
This happy prediction was speedily confounded. After a com-
mittee, in a thoroughly researched and reasoned report, had damned
the proposed rules as "wholly inadequate," 102 the Bar Association
adopted the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the Pennsylvania Bar Association respect-
fully recommends to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and its
Procedural Rules Committee that rules governing depositions
and discovery substantially in conformity with those contained in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be adopted." 103
Though this did result in yet a third draft of rules even more liberal,
which were finally adopted, no one would claim that the rules as
adopted are "substantially in conformity" with the Federal Rules or
other modem pleading rules.
The requirement that discovery shall be had only upon petition
of a party and order of court 104 is particularly baffing. Criticized as
"a tedious waste of time" by the Bar Association Committee,10 5 its only
effect would seem to be that of delay and idle argument at a stage in
101. Ibid.
102. Report of Procedural Rules Coonmm. of Pa. Bar Ass'i, 55 ANN. REP. PA.
B. Ass'N 172 (1949). Judges. too, have evidenced doubts about so restrictive dis-
covery rules. In addition to the cases cited on specific points, almost all of which
call for a "liberal" construction of the rules, see the dicta of judge Bok: "This
is relatively new ground, possibly newer than need be because it is more restricted
than the Federal procedure relating to discovery." De Simone v. City of Philadel-
phia, 78 Pa. D. & C. 433 (1951). See also the fine statement by judge Flood in a
decision in which he was compelled to hold that plaintiff could not get, by discovery,
an advance statement of defendant's version of the collision: "There is a very con-
siderable body of professional opinion that such a preview of a party's testimony,
as provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is a very desirable thing.
We agree with this view. . . . But the view was rejected by those who drafted
and promulgated our Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure relating to discovery."
Barlow v. Waples, 82 Pa. D. & C. 1, 2 (1952). The only good word for the present
discovery rules, except from their draftsmen, that I have seen is the student Note,
Some Observations on Discovery and Deposition Under the New Pennsylvania Riles,
26 TEmP. L.Q. 299, 309 (1953). The moderately favorable conclusion this student
draws comes after a helpful discussion in which he is almost uniformly critical of
particular provisions of the rules, and in which he makes a good summary of the
cases, which have been equally critical of the restrictive tendencies of the rules.
103. The resolution is set out at 55 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'N 99 (1949), and
was adopted id. at 109. This expression of bar sentiment is consistent with the views
of practicing attorneys throughout the country. I have elsewhere reported on a
survey in which members of the bar in states with liberal discovery procedures were
asked many questions on the expense and usefulness of discovery, culminating with
the question: "Would you recommend that Minnesota and other states adopt the
discovery process? 97-Yes; 1-Yes, if it is modified; 0-No." Wright, Wegner
& Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D.
97, 104 (1952).
104. PA. R. Civ. P. 4005-4013.
105. Report of Procedural Riles Comn. of Pa. Bar Assn, 55 ANN. REP. PA. B.
Ass'N 172, 175 (1949).
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the proceedings when it is least possible to give an accurate answer as
to whether particular questions should be allowed. Thus it is that the
trial courts seem uniformly to be allowing discovery if there is any pos-
sibility that the discovery sought may be proper; 10" having to give
an advisory opinion before questioning has actually started, when there
is little or no factual basis to judge the propriety of a particular line
of inquiry, they could hardly do otherwise. The result is that an addi-
tional inconvenient and expensive appearance in court is required to
take advantage of a procedure which its critics already denounce as
inconvenient and expensive. Strangely there is no such requirement
of permission from the court in order to serve a demand for an admis-
sion of the genuineness of a document; -17 even Mr. Amram finds this
system "obviously superior." -08
Much more important is the restriction which prevents discovery
that would disclose facts "not competent or admissible as evidence" 109
or "not necessary to prepare the pleadings or prove a prima facie claim
or defense of the petitioner." 110 It is this restriction, more than any-
thing else in the Rules, which supports the charge of a local scholar:
"In Pennsylvania a law suit is still to be a fight, a battle of wits
. . .. 2y "- And it is of this restriction that Mr. Amram speaks
when he notes that the prior practice did not operate fully to prevent
surprise at the trial, and that this limitation "is designed to continue
the prior practice without change in this regard." 112 Surprise, appar-
ently, is another "Pennsylvania tradition . . .of proven merit."
Among the foremost tenets of modern pleading is that surprise
should no longer be a permissible weapon in the lawyer's arsenal, that
a party should have all the facts, no matter which side they favor, be-
fore coming to court, and' that the rules of evidence, worthy as they
may be at the trial of a case, should not bar a party from finding out
where he can get admissible evidence. Even in states such as New
York and Michigan, the first hopelessly reactionary in matters of pro-
cedure and the second only a little more modem, this fundamental
106. Cf. Klosterman v. Clark, 78 Pa. D. & C. 263, 264 (1951) ; Regency Clothes,
Inc. v. Progressive Clothes, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C. 450, 451 (1951).
107. PA. R. Civ. P. 4014.
108. 3 GooDRIC-AmRAm § 4014-1.
109. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(c) (2).
110. PA. R. Crv. P. 4011(c) (4).
111. Note, A Discstssion of the New Pennsylvania Rides Relating To Deposition's
and Discovery, 55 DIcm. L. REv. 252, 269 (1951).
112. 3 GooDRIcH-AMRAM § 4011(c)-12. See Graubart, Are We Afraid of Pre-
trial Discovery, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 166 (1949) : "Every lawyer in Pennsylvania has tried
at least one case which he lost because he did not have all the available evidence.
Sometimes the missing evidence has been in his opponent's file; sometimes it has been
in the knowledge of a witness whose name he did not have."
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truth has penetrated, and has produced liberal court decisions repudi-
ating the kind of restrictions which Pennsylvania, by rule, now im-
poses." 3
There is a happier side to this story. Plaintiff brings a personal
injury action, seeking to recover for lost earnings. Defendant wishes to
get the facts as to plaintiff's earnings in the past. Are these necessary
to prove a prima facie defense of the defendant, who is the party seek-
ing discovery, and thus the "petitioner" within the meaning of the
rule? I should hardly have thought so-proof of damages seems to
me part of plaintiff's case but not of defendant's. Yet both judges to
pass on this question have allowed such discovery." 4 The result seems
highly commendable; indeed in Minnesota we have gone to the extent
of requiring plaintiffs in personal injury cases to produce their state
income tax returns for the past five years, or, if they claim not to have
copies, require them to authorize the Commissioner of Taxation to
make these returns available to defendant." 5  But of course in Minne-
sota we have not tried to retain the element of surprise in law suits." 6
Take another case: a township brings an action to restrain de-
fendant from practicing dentistry in an area zoned as residential. De-
fendant's answer raises the defense that his practice of dentistry is
accessory to his use of the property as a bona fide residence. The
township wishes to serve interrogatories asking how many nights in a
given period defendant slept at the premises, how much time his family
was there, and other similar questions. Are these proper under Rule
4011 (c) (4) ? Again I should have thouglht rather clearly not, since
the township's prima facie claim is complete on a showing that the
property is zoned residential and that defendant is practicing dentistry
there. Yet again the court allowed the interrogatories, saying only that
they were "pertinent to the issues involved." "I
The temptation is great to look at these decisions and to say that
the judges have read these restrictions, which I think unwise, out of
113. E.g., Vincent v. Van Blooys, 263 Mich. 312, 248 N.W. 633 (1933); Marie
Dorros, Inc. v. Dorros Bros., Inc., 274 App. Div. 11, 80 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't
1948). The holding of the latter case has recently been promulgated as a court
rule. N.Y.R. Civ. P. 121-a, commented upon in 52 Co. L. Ray. 1071 (1952).
114. Regency Clothes, Inc. v. Progressive Clothes, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C. 450
(1951); Dorfman v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 79 Pa. D. & C. 380 (1952).
These cases are approved at 3 GooDRIcH-AmRAm §§ 4011(c) -4, 4011 (c) -12 n.18.
115. The decisions are unreported, but are briefed at Report of Court Riles Com-
inittee, 10 BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA 9 (1953). On the other side of the coin,
some of our trial judges have been requiring defendant to produce his liability in-
surance policy. Ibid.
116. Under our rule discovery is permitted "whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party." MINN.
R. Civ. P. 26.02.
117. Lower Merion Twp. v. Hobson, 79 Pa. D. & C. 385, 389 (1952).
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the Rules. Such a judgment is premature, however, since the Rules
are new, the decisions few, and the courts in the country not yet heard
from. But these decisions do emphasize the futility of the restrictions
which the Committee sought to impose. Will anyone really contend
that the discovery should not have been allowed in the cases presented?
Is there any real justification for trying to make the township in the
zoning case wait until defendant has presented in court his evidence
that he lives on the premises, and then hurry out to try and accumulate
facts to refute such evidence? Or for making it similarly difficult for
defendants in personal injury cases to meet the plaintiff's proof of
damages?
Except in mandamus actions,11 8 the new Pennsylvania procedure
makes no provision for summary judgments."1 This is the more sur-
prising because the summary judgment procedure has been so widely
adopted by states with all sorts of pleading-code, common-law, and
modern; 120 indeed probably no state in the union has made more fre-
quent and successful use of the summary judgment to dispose of phony
claims and sham defenses than has Wisconsin, 121 which does not have
a generally modern pleading system. The need for summary judg-
ments is especially great in Pennsylvania, where the old rule against
the so-called "speaking demurrer" has been retained. 2 Here the
emphasis, already discussed in other contexts, on formal pleadings
rather than on the real merits reaches its finest fruition. A plaintiff
can bring a claim which, on indisputable facts, cannot possibly prevail,
118. PA. R. Civ. P. 1098.
119. Though the court speaks of a "summary judgment" in Lacy v. East Broad
Top Railroad & Coal Co., 168 Pa. Super. 351, 77 A.2d 706 (1951), it is apparent
that it actually is referring to "judgment on the pleadings," a quite different-and
less effective-procedure.
120. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADmINISTRATION 219-220
(1949), lists 28 jurisdictions with some form of summary judgment procedure. The
figure should be taken with a healthy grain of salt, since Pennsylvania, on the basis
of Rules 1037, 1071, 1084, 1098, is included on the list.
121. Wisconsin was among the first to allow summary judgment to either party
in any kind of action. Wis. STAT. c. 270, §270.635 (1951), first adopted in 1935.
Further the court in that state has been liberal in allowing use of this procedure.
E.g., Petrie v. Roberts, 242 Wis. 539, 8 N.W.2d 355 (1943); Young, The Work
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Pleading, Practice & Procedure, Evidence,
Remnedies [1944] Wis. L. REv. 141, 161-2; Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MIi.
L. REv. 567, 576 (1952).
122. Lacy v. East Broad Top Railroad & Coal Co., 168 Pa. Super. 351, 77 A.2d
706 (1951); 1 GooDRC-AmtRAm § 1017(b)-11. A summary judgment rule, and
particularly a provision like MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.04, which allows the court to
specify the facts that appear without substantial controversy, is needed if pre-trial
conferences are to have any real teeth in them, as urged by Judge Kenworthey and
Mr. Amram. See text at 931 supra. On this interrelation of the pre-trial and summary
judgment rules, see Woods v. Mertes 9 F.R.D. 318, (D.C. Del. 1949); Anno., Bind-
ing Effect of Court's Order Entered after Pretrial Conference, 22 A.L.R.2d 599 (1952) ;
Note, Calendar Congestion in the Southern District of New York, 51 CoL. L. Rnv.
1037, 1050-1 (1951).
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but he will have a trial; defendant will not be allowed to bring in any
matter outside the pleadings to show that plaintiff has no right of re-
covery. Where plaintiff has a worthy claim, he must still wait his
turn on the calendar and go to the expense of a trial in order to collect,
save in the rare case where defendant has failed to draw down from
his form book the appropriate stylized and purely formal allegations
of an answer needed to create an apparent "issue."
Summary judgment procedure in modern pleading jurisdictions
does not mean, as some have feared, "trial by affidavit." Judgment
may be entered only where "there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." ' If the courts have erred in application of this test,
it has been in leaning over backward to refuse summary judgment if
there is any possibility of such an issue.124 To say that a party has a
right to a trial where there is no such genuine issue, and where, as a
matter of law, the other party is entitled to judgment, is to exalt form
over substance, at the price of expense and delay to the parties and
additional business for already overworked judges.
Suppose, for example, that plaintiff brings a slander action, claim-
ing that he did not hear the slanderous remark himself, but that de-
fendant made it in the presence of two other people. Defendant and
the two supposed hearers all swear that no such remark was ever
made. What possible reason can there be for requiring a trial here
when it is clear that the trial judge would have to direct a verdict for
defendant at the close of plaintiff's case? It was so reasoned, and a
summary judgment granted defendant, by two judges who have been
most conservative in their allowance of summary judgments.'25 In
Pennsylvania a trial will be had, for there is no procedure to dispose of
the claim more expeditiously.
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
I could write at greaf length on the always fascinating subject of
joinder.2 Actually the number of cases in which joinder could pos-
123. MiNix. R. Civ. P. 56.03.
124. E.g., Klancher v. Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923 (1945) ; Traylor
v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Peckham v. Ronrico
Corp., 171 F.Zd 653 (1st Cir. 1948); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1946) ; Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
See Melville, Summary Judgment and Discovery: The Aiended Rdes Will Add
to Their Usefulness, 34 A.B.A.J. 187 (1948) ; Clark, Special Problems if; Drafting
and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rides, 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 493, 503-5 (1950).
125. Dyer v. MacIougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952) (with opinions by L.
Hand and Frank).
126. Indeed I have, 53 pages worth. Wright, Joinder of Claints and Parties
Under Modern Pleading Riles, 36 MiNN. L. REv. 580 (1952).
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sibly be appropriate does not justify the central position which this
subject has had in procedural reform; it is of importance, however,
because it so well illustrates the fundamental thrust of modern plead-
ing in the direction of speedy and economical disposition of contro-
versies, and of achieving this end by broad discretion in the trial court
rather than by detailed rule. Joinder is of interest, too, because here,
perhaps more clearly than in other contexts, it is seen that the rules
now so in vogue are an improvement on the past but not yet the final
answer. The trend for the last century has been toward throwing off
the ancient shackles, and making possible completely free joinder;
for the future one can expect progress toward requiring joinder of
similar claims and related parties.11
7
The rules on joinder now in effect in the modern pleading sys-
tems are quite simple. Effectively unlimited joinder is allowed at the
pleading stage, with discretion given to the trial judge to order sepa-
rate trials for particular claims or issues "in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice." 28 Surely this is as much as can be asked; if
joinder of claims and parties, no matter how unrelated, seems desirable
to one of the parties, and if this joinder will not prejudice anyone, nor
cause the case to become too complicated for the jury to unravel, there
can be no possible objection to such joinder. The trial judge, who can
see how the case is to be tried and what the issues will be, is better
able to decide what convenience and the avoidance of prejudice require
than are the rulemakers when they try to make a detailed rule on the
subject.
Pennsylvania has adopted a rather curious compromise on this
subject. Your Rules give the trial court the needed discretion to order
separate trials of separate issues where convenience or possible preju-
dice so indicate, in language almost identical with that used in the
modern pleading systems.'29 Yet this discretion is actually of little
importance, for the rules on joinder are so detailed and so restrictive
that there must be very little occasion for the trial judge ever to exercise
this power.
127. As in the popular rule requiring defendant to assert as a counterclaim any
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as plaintiff's claim. E.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a). This rule is now in effect in 16 states, two territories,
and all the Federal courts. Only in Minnesota has there been doubt as to its use-
fulness. See note 164 infra. And see generally Blume, Required Joinder of Claims,
45 MicH. L. REv. 797, 812 (1947): "Judges have been appalled by the thought of
trying in one action all claims which might arise from a major disaster. The writer
is appalled by the thought of any other course." See also Note, Joinder of Actions,
40 Ky. L.J. 105, 112 (1951).
128. E.g., MiNe. R. Civ. P. 42.02.
129. PA. R. Civ. P. 213(b).
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Enough has been said in other parts of this paper to show the
strange restrictions which limit joinder by a plaintiff of causes of
action; "0 on the one hand, a claim for an injunction can be joined
with an entirely unrelated claim for specific performance, 31 while on
the other hand, the landlord whose case we examined must bring two
suits to obtain redress for the various harms inflicted by the deadbeat
tenant.132 Another illustration of the trouble caused by trying to regu-
late joinder at the pleading stage involves the counterclaim rule. Plain-
tiff sued for the wrongful attachment by defendant of plaintiff's truck
on February 13; defendant counterclaimed charging that on February
2 plaintiff had wrongfully attached defendant's automobile. In a deci-
sion particularly forceful because it is from the pen of one of America's
greatest living judges, a motion to strike the counterclaim was granted,
on the ground that it had not been shown that the two wrongs arose
from the same series of transactions or occurrences.
"Merely because two people separately attach each other's prop-
erty does not mean that they are at odds over the same thing.
.. My conclusion is that Pa. R. C. P. 1046 was not intended
to allow two parties to try in one suit every cause of action that
exists between them, connected or not, but rather to try in one suit
all claims and phases that grow out of a single cause of action.
If it were otherwise, confusion would be confounded." '
I do not suggest that this decision is necessarily wrong-it may well be
that the two attachments were entirely unrelated, and that confusion
would have been confounded by trying them together. My objection
is to a system which demands that this decision be made on the plead-
ings alone, and thus at a time and on a record from which no one
can possibly tell whether the joinder would be in the interest of fair
and expeditious disposition of litigation. It is quite possible-indeed
the proximity in time of the two attachments tempts me to use stronger
language-that the wrongs claimed here may turn on but one contro-
versy between the parties. If this is so, then the solution of this con-
troversy should be enough to dispose of both claims, and the niceties
of "what is a cause of action" should not bar settlement of the mat-
ter in one lawsuit. If it should turn out the other way, if it should
appear after discovery and a pre-trial conference that the claims do
turn on issues so different that they could not conveniently be litigated
130. See text at note 21 supra.
131. PA. R. Civ. P. 1508.
132. See text at note 55 mupra. Baker v. Connolly, 23 Northumb. Legal J. 171
(1951).
133. Bok, PJ., Watkins Produce Co. v, Kanitsky, 68 Pa. D. & C. 198, 199-200
(1949).
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at one trial, the judge could then use the power given him by the Rules
to order separate trials of the separate issues. What sense is there in
absolutely barring the counterclaim at the outset because of the chance
that it might later be necessary to order a separate trial of it?
Again what advantage is there in preservation of the common-
law rule that a counterclaim must be for all the defendants and against
all the plaintiffs in the same capacity in which they are joined on plain-
tiff's claims? 184 It may be that allowing a counterclaim that does not
meet this test will be inconvenient or prejudicial, but whether this will
be true in a particular case cannot be told until the case has arisen
and the issues in it have been discovered.
The counterclaim rules have some strange quirks which result
from the Committee's attempt to provide detailed regulation by rule.
Suppose again the case previously considered, where the parties have
made two entirely distinct and unrelated contracts. We have previ-
ously seen that the plaintiff may join claims for breach of the two
contracts, whether he sues for damages 185 or specific performance.13
6
Further, if plaintiff asks damages for breach of one of the contracts,
defendant may counterclaim for damages for breach of the other con-
tract." But if plaintiff asks for specific performance of one contract,
defendant cannot assert any counterclaim on the other contract, for
this does not arise from the "same transaction" as plaintiff's claim." 8
The Pennsylvania rules on joinder of parties ... are unobjection-
able; they allow a very broad joinder, in terms almost the same as in
the modern pleading jurisdictions, and to date they seem to have been
liberally interpreted. 4 ° One caveat needs to be noted: in the pages of
procedural history, there is hardly any story as sad as that of bold
and liberal provisions for joinder of parties being restricted by older
and more confining rules on joinder of causes of action. The classic
case is the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Ader v.
Blau."4 In that case one defendant was charged with negligence in
134. Compare Dickerson v. Dickerson Overseas Co., 369 Pa. 244, 85 A.2d 102
(1952) with Abraham v. Selig, 29 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Alpaugh v.
Battles, 235 App. Div. 321, 257 N.Y. Supp. 126 (lst Dep't 1932).
135. PA. R. Civ. P. 1020(a).
136. PA. R. Civ. P. 1508. But he may not ask for damages for breach of one
contract, and specific performance of the other. See text at note 64 supra.
137. PA. R. CiM. P. 1031.
138. PA. R. Civ. P. 1510.
139. PA. R. Civ. P. 2227-9.
140. E.g., Sarfert Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Parayarn Co., 75 Pa. D. & C. 58
(1950) ; see State Employes' Retirement Board v. Dumbauld, 59 Dauph. Co. Rep.
446, 454 (1948).
141. 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925). There is a wealth of law review com-
ment on this case; it is collected at CLARx, CODE PLEADING 439, 440 (2d ed. 1947).
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having erected a dangerous iron fence, on which plaintiff's intestate
was impaled, while a second defendant was charged with having caused
the death by negligent treatment of the injured youth. The court,
over a dissent by Judge Cardozo, held that the rules on joinder of
defendants were limited by the older rules on joinder of causes, that
the claims against the two defendants constituted two causes of action,
and that these were not causes "arising out of the same transaction or
transactions connected with the same subject of action." Thus the
joinder was found to be improper. Though a different result could
have been reached in that case,'4 the restrictive decision actually
handed down dealt joinder in New York a blow from which it took 24
years, several legislative revisions, and finally a liberal decision of the
Court of Appeals, to recover.3
He would be a bold soul indeed who would predict that Ader v.
Blau would be differently decided in Pennsylvania, for all the elements
which produced that decision are present in your state. The Pennsyl-
vania rules on joinder of parties are almost identical with the statutes
then in force in New York, while the rule on joinder of causes in tres-
pass 4' is, if anything, more restrictive than was the New York stat-
ute. A number of Pennsylvania decisions evidence a very narrow
understanding of the concepts "cause of action" 145 and "same trans-
action." 146 There is a Common Pleas decision allowing joinder in a
situation analogous *to Ader v. Blau; 147 until such a holding has been
approved by the Supreme Court, there can be no assurance that your
fine new party joinder rules will not be emasculated by your restrictive
rules on joinder of causes of action.
There are no very great differences between the Pennsylvania
rules providing special devices of party joinder, such as class suits,
intervention, and interpleader, and the rules in the modern pleading
142. Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d 124, 148 P.2d 23 (1944) ; cf. De Groot v. People's
State Bank of Reeseville, 183 Wis. 594, 198 N.W. 614 (1924); Adderton v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 182 S.C. 465, 189 S.E. 736 (1937), disapproved 85 U. OF PA.
L. Rv. 843. Contra: Grady, Recr. v. Warren, 201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
143. See Cark and Wright, The Jutdical Council and the Rule-Making Power:
A Dissent atd a Protest, 1 SYRAcusE L. REv. 346, 357-9 (1950).
144. PA. R. CIV. P. 1044.
145. E.g., Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat. Bank, 362 Pa. 30,
68 A.2d 768 (1949) ; Volta v. Markovitz Bros., 351 Pa. 243, 40 A.2d 388 (1945) ;
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Myers, 67 Pa. D. & C. 430 (1949). But cf. Bollin v. Elevator
Construction & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949).
146. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 66 A.2d 309 (1949) ; Watkins Produce
Co. v. Kanitsky, 68 Pa. D. & C. 198 (1949).
147. McCaslin v. Bell, 71 Pa. D. & C. 620 (1950), allowing joinder of the
owner and operator of the car which struck plaintiff, and two repairmen who made
repairs to plaintiff's car which might have caused the accident. Lest too much weight
be given this decision, it should be noted that the New York lower courts also al-
lowed liberal joinder until the Court of Appeals slapped their fingers in Ader v. Blau.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 439 n.15 (2d ed. 1947).
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jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania rules providing for what we call
"impleader" or "third party practice" and what you call "joinder of
additional defendants" are especially admirable. The most striking
and important feature of the Pennsylvania rules on this subject is that
which allows joinder of a third party who may be "alone liable or liable
over . . .or jointly or severally liable . *..." 48 Most modern
rules allow defendant to implead a third party only if the third party
"is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him." "' Thus it is not possible in most states, as it is in Pennsylvania,
to bring in someone who is thought to be liable to the plaintiff, rather
than merely liable over to the defendant. Most states preserve
the right of the plaintiff to choose which of a number of possible de-
fendants he will sue; this deference to plaintiff's whim can have serious
consequences to the defendant who is barred in this way from getting
contribution from a joint tortfeasor, 5 ° or who is put under the hand-
icap of trying to convince the jury that someone else is responsible
for plaintiff's injuries, without having this third party in the case where
the jury can assess the blame against him. 5
Among the other excellences of the Pennsylvania impleader rules
is that they allow impleader as of right; no leave of court is required
and the impleader, if timely, cannot be refused on any ground. 52 In
other jurisdictions it is usually discretionary with the court whether
to allow impleader.' Such a provision is especially unsound because
it requires the trial court to exercise this discretion at the time of serv-
ing the third-party complaint, when decision is in a vacuum, rather
than after the third-party defendant has answered, or raised his own
objections to being brought into suit, at which time it could be much
better seen whether the impleader will complicate or delay the litiga-
tion.'-5 Also worthy of favorable note is the holding that a defendant
148. PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a), 2255(d).
149. E.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
150. E.g., Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E.
289 (1931) ; Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943).
151. This disadvantage is well discussed in a case which, however, does not in-
volve impleader. Way v. Waterloo, C.F. & N.R.R., 239 Iowa 244, 257-8, 29 N.W.2d
867, 874 (1947), 27 NEB. L. REv. 590 (1948).
152. 2 GooDRIcH-AmRAm § 2252(a)-1.
153. General Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Com-
mentary, Discretion of Court on Motion to Implead, 2 FED. RULES SERv. 648 (1940).
154. I have suggested that courts should allow impleader as of course, leaving
it to a later motion to strike service of the third-party complaint to test whether
the impleader is worthwhile. Wright, Joinder of Clains and Parties Under Modern
Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rxv. 580, 612 (1952). It has recently been held,
however, that such a motion to strike would amount to a rehearing of the court's
order allowing impleader, and that it is, therefore, improper. Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 13 F.R.D. 324 (M.D. Tenn. 1953).
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and the third party he impleads are truly adverse parties, and that the
original defendant must be prepared to state his whole case against the
third party when he impleads him, and to enter a claim at that time
for all the relief to which he may be entitled arising out of the cause
of action upon which the suit was originally brought.'5
Unfortunately all is not sweetness and light even in these out-
standingly fine rules on impleader. Trouble comes from the restrictive
definition of "cause of action" which has led to a prohibition against
impleader of an express indemnitor or insurer,5 6 though impleader is
allowed where the duty to indemnify arises by operation of law.' 7
Nothing in the Rules themselves bars impleader of defendant's insurer,
and a commentator admits that the real reason why such impleader
will not be allowed is "the Pennsylvania policy prohibiting the disclos-
ure in personal injury cases of the fact that the defendant is insured."'
M
Yet in other jurisdictions, where this policy is no less strong than in
Pennsylvania, impleader of the insurer is invariably allowed.159 The
problem can arise, after all, only when the insurer has refused to de-
fend the action, since if it is conducting the defense it is hardly likely
to implead itself. Impleader in such a circumstance surely does not
prejudice the plaintiff, and if the defendant thinks he would be preju-
diced thereby he has his remedy in refusing to bring in the third party.
The only party possibly prejudiced is the insurer, which has already
breached its contract by which it had agreed to defend the action; 160
155. Simodejka v. Williams, 360 Pa. 332, 62 A.2d 17 (1949), approved 10 U. oF
Prrr. L. Rnv. 421. The criticism of this case at GooDRicri-Ammm, ANNO. to
§ 2252(b)-1, seems to ignore the desirability of settling at one time all controversies
arising out of the same factual sequence, the goal which is lauded at 2 GooDRicH-
AamAm § 2255 (d) -9.
156. Volta v. Markovitz Bros., 351 Pa. 243, 40 A.2d 388 (1945) ; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Myers, 67 Pa. D. & C. 430 (1949); Scott Grosse v. Krall, 41 Luz.
Legal Reg. Rep. 380 (1951); Globe Electric Repair Co. v. Eagle Ind. Co., 99
Pitt. Legal J. 533 (1951) ; 2 GooDmicH-AmRAm § 2252(a) -7. But cf. Turberville v.
West Penn Water Co., 60 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1947) ; Bollin v. Elevator Const. & Repair
Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949), approved 10 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 594, where it is
claimed that this case silently overrules Volta v. Markovitz Bros., supra.
157. In re Hannan, 52 Pa. D. & C. 160 (1944) ; 2 GoODpiCH-AMP.AM § 2252(a) -7.
158. 2 GooDRcEM-AmAm §2252(a)-7. Compare Amram, The New Procedural
Rides, 47 ANN. REP. PA. B. Ass'r 409, 416 (1941) : "I have been told by lawyers
from other states that they consider Pennsylvania somewhat medieval in the way
it carefully protects insurance companies who carry casualty insurance in connection
with automobile litigation ...
"Those of us who try jury cases know that most jurymen, in passing on automo-
bile cases, are rather inclined in the jury room to discuss first the question as to
whether or not they think the defendant is insured, before they discuss the question
of liability and damage."
159. I have collected the cases, and analyzed the problem in detail, at Wright,
Joinder of Claint, and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REv.
580, 615-7 (1952).
160. See Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140, 142 (W.D. Mo. 1945). Even the
prejudice to the insurer may be an imaginary horrible. See the sophisticated Coin-
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if there is any fear of prejudice to the insurer, the power to order sep-
arate trials of separate issues provides sufficient protection.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
decisions in which they have been applied, has shown some unusual
tendencies: cases are being decided on pleading technicalities rather
than on their merits; surprise has been retained as a weapon of shrewd
counsel; the pleadings are asked to accomplish certain functions which
experience in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, shows that they cannot suc-
cessfully do; joinder is still regarded as a matter of pleading, rather
than of trial management to be left to the discretion of the judge.
These tendencies cannot help but be dismaying to an outsider who has
seen in his own state the improvement which has resulted from move-
ment in the opposite direction.
Yet, as I promised at the outset, I do not urge you in Pennsylvania
to adopt the Minnesota Rules or the Federal Rules or any other set of
rules. I would not so urge even if I were sufficiently acquainted with
Pennsylvania needs and problems to judge intelligently what proce-
dure is best adapted to your courts. There are those who think that
you would be well advised to make your local practice uniform with
that which prevails in the federal courts in your state; ' I would
regard such uniformity as barren and stultifying.
The one lesson of transcending importance to be drawn from the
whole history of procedural reform has been well stated by that science's
most distinguished votary:
.Inal . ..no system of pleading yet devised may be considered
final . . unless pleading rules are subject to constant exam-
ination and revaluation, they petrify and become hindrances, not
aids, to the administration of justice." 162
I have great confidence in, and respect for, the members of the Advis-
ory Committee to the United States Supreme Court, who were charged
with the preparation of the Federal Rules, and the amendments thereto,
but I am sure that they would be the first to urge that they not be the
ment, Estoppel, Third Party Practice, and Insurer's Defenses, 19 U. oF CI. L. REv.
546, 552-6 (1952), which argues persuasively that it will be in the insurer's interest
to be impleaded.
161. Note, The Bar Favors Uniform State and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
18 Tmsp. L.Q. 145 (1943).
162. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 60 (2d ed. 1947). See also Clark, Special Problems
in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. zEv.. 493, 507-
8 (1950).
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only ones to carry on this process of "constant examination and reval-
uation," and that they be helped by independent Rules Committees in
each state. One of the real advantages of a federal system of govern-
ment is that it provides 48 laboratories in which to experiment with
judicial procedure, as with all other branches of civil government.
Examples of this thesis, that experimentation by individual states
may be helpful to all, are so numerous that only a few can be stated.
Modern pleading itself is essentially a codification of a number of differ-
ent procedures which various states had tried and found good. The
committee which prepared the very recent Nevada Rules modelled one
of these, not on the corresponding Federal rule, but on the rule adopted
in Minnesota; yet in doing so it made a change which provides, I
think, a more satisfactory solution than that which had been achieved
in either the Federal or the Minnesota systems.'o In my state we are
about to try a fourth different form of the compulsory counterclaim
rule.'6 4 Even this, I think, will not be the final answer: when we do
achieve a satisfactory solution of this problem, it will be because the
lawyers have learned for themselves from experience what works best,
rather than accepting someone else's dogma. In Pennsylvania you
have made similar frequent changes in the rules governing third party
practice; 165 by such a process you have arrived at a rule which is, in
many respects, better than that to be found in other jurisdictions.
Of course there is a corollary to this proposition that experimen-
tation in procedure is desirable: when a number of jurisdictions have
demonstrated that a new technique works well, other states should
163. Compare NEv. R. Civ. P. 81(a), and the Advisory Committee Note thereto,
with FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a), and MINN. R. Civ. P. 81.01.
164. The original draft of the Minnesota Rules required a claim to be pleaded
as a compulsory counterclaim if it arose out of the "transaction or occurence" from
which plaintiff's claim arose. The critical phrase was then changed to "contract
or transaction," and finally to "transaction," the form in which the rule now stands.
For this history see Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 580, 587-591 (1952). The Bar Association's Court Rules
Committee has now recommended that the key phrase be changed back to "transac-
tion or occurrence," but that a proviso be added to the effect that the claim need
not be pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim if defendant has any contract indemnify-
ing him against liability for all or part of plaintiff's claim against him. It may be
suggested that Minnesota has ignored the very favorable experience with compulsory
counterclaims in all kinds of litigation in a score of other jurisdictions and to some
extent I agree with this criticism. The answer of the Minnesota rulemakers would
be that they have been impressed with the sad results of requiring counterclaims where
defendant is represented by an insurance company lawyer, as shown in such a case
as Keller v. Keldikman, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951) ; cf. Ross v. Stricker,
153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950). But the result reached in the cases thought
so horrible has also been reached, on grounds of estoppel, in a state which has no
compulsory counterclaims. Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17, 80 A2d 196 (1951).
165. 2 GooDRIcia-AMRAM § 2251-1; 3 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTIc E § 14.22 (2d
ed. 1948).
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accept that experience and that finding in the absence of any com-
pelling local problem. The creative scientist does not waste his time
duplicating experiments which others have successfully performed.
Similarly Rules Committees should not be induced, by that xenophobia
with which lawyers customarily view the practice of other jurisdic-
tions,16" to ignore the record of successes 17 and of failures 168 which
particular reforms have made in other places. To the extent that par-
ticular concepts and rules have worked well in other places and are
adaptable to Pennsylvania necessities, and to that extent only, would
I suggest that your Committee consider modelling your practice on
such other rules. The indications discussed earlier that there was
strong bar sentiment in Pennsylvania favoring more drastic reform
seem to support my own feeling that your state could profitably adopt
rules considerably closer to those of the modern pleading jurisdictions
than so far you have done. Certainly, too, your experience would
be more helpful to procedural reformers in other jurisdictions if you
had adopted at least the framework of modern pleading; in most in-
stances nothing significant can be learned by study of your rules
because they presuppose an emphasis on medievalisms which most
jurisdictions have long since rejected.
In the course of this study I have been particularly impressed by
the Pennsylvania rule which allows impleader of a third party who is
alone liable to the plaintiff; ... if continued experience with this rule in
Pennsylvania is as successful as it seems to be to date, I would hope
that Minnesota might profit from that experience and make a cor-
responding provision in its rules. Similarly I should hope that law-
yers and scholars in Pennsylvania will study our experience in allow-
ing impleader of defendant's insurer; 171 perhaps you will conclude
166. The classic example is the study in MORGAN et at., TiE LAW OF EVlBIqEcE
c. 3 and App. A-D (1927) ; lawyers of New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts,
questioned with respect to the three strikingly different attitudes toward the ad-
missibility in evidence of declarations of deceased persons, all believed firmly that
only the attitude of their own jurisdiction was sound. Dellefield v. Blockdel Realty
Co.. 128 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1942). Compare Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918): "We are not so
provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with
it otherwise at home."
167. As I think may have been true of the Pennsylvania Procedural Rules Com-
mittee in not providing for summary judgment. See text beginning at note 118
supra.
168. As I think may have been true of the Pennsylvania Procedural Rules
Committee in overlooking the possibility that their joinder rules might be subjected
to such a restrictive interpretation as were the similar New York rules in Ader v.
Blau. See text at note 139 mtpra.
169. See text at note 148 supra.
170. See text at note 159 supra.
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that your practice would be improved by allowing such impleader.
What is needed, above all, in procedural reform is such a willingness
to learn from others, and to reexamine local practices with a fresh
viewpoint, rather than one inhibited by years of habit. It is to such a
process in Pennsylvania that I hope this paper may contribute.
